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ABSTRACT 
  The recent resolution of the Andrew Oliver case may mark the 
death throes of the NCAA’s no-agent rule, prohibiting college athletes 
from retaining agents in professional contract negotiations, and 
perhaps the traditional paradigm of amateurism in sport. In light of 
the trial court’s ruling, as well as continuing calls for the revocation of 
the NCAA’s tax-exempt status, the time is ripe for a reexamination of 
amateurism and the law. 
  This Note argues that the NCAA has developed a complicated web 
of largely unenforceable rules and regulations that are unnecessary to 
maintain tax-exempt status in light of the regulatory environment. 
This Note examines the antitrust, labor, and tax consequences of 
changing definitions of amateurism. Focusing on the Internal 
Revenue Service interpretations of amateurism, this Note concludes 
that a less restrictive amateurism regime would still achieve many of 
the legal benefits sought by the NCAA. This analysis has broader 
implications for tax policy and the culture of sport. 
  Calling for a shift to a “new amateurism,” this Note contributes 
a novel redefinition of amateurism that reflects the current 
environment of intercollegiate sport. Modern amateurism should 
recognize the profit motive of the student-athlete. Under a less 
restrictive NCAA rule-making regime, the remaining rules are 
enforceable and fair. In substituting protections for student-athletes in 
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place of the current paternalism, the NCAA will reduce the likelihood 
that future rules will be overturned by court challenges. 
INTRODUCTION 
  Deep into the night of Friday, May 30, 2008, Andrew Oliver 
fought for his college baseball life. Compliance officials from 
Oklahoma State and the NCAA interviewed him from about 
8:30 p.m. until after midnight and then questioned his father from 
12:30 until the small hours of the morning . . . .1 
Projected first-round draft pick Andrew Oliver had become a 
true ace on the mound for the Oklahoma State Cowboys as a 
sophomore left-handed pitcher.2 Oliver’s team had earned a coveted 
spot in the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) 
Tournament’s initial field of 64 and on May 30 the team started down 
the road to the 2008 College World Series in Omaha in the Stillwater 
Regional.3 But Oliver never got a chance to join his team in 
postseason play.4 Just hours before Oliver was slated to pitch on 
May 31 against Wichita State, his athletic eligibility was revoked 
“indefinitely” for a violation of the NCAA’s amateurism rules.5 
Oliver’s actions would in any other context be described as 
prudent: a high school senior, Oliver retained an agent-attorney to 
assist him in a complex financial arrangement with a sophisticated 
party, and his attorney was present during contract negotiations.6 
Those actions, which came to light two years later, clearly violated the 
NCAA’s no-agent rule,7 which is found in the organization’s bylaws.8 
 
 1. Aaron Fitt, Baseball’s Agent Quagmire: Oliver Case Dredges up Agent-NCAA 
Questions, BASEBALL AM., Sept. 8–21, 2008, at 8. 
 2. Aaron Fitt, Headed to Trial: Oliver Case May Have Lasting Ramifications, BASEBALL 
AM., Dec. 22, 2008, http://www.baseballamerica.com/today/college/on-campus/2009/267366. 
html. 
 3. 2008 NCAA Baseball Tournament Schedule/Results, ESPN.COM, June 26, 2008, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=3412793. 
 4. See Fitt, supra note 1, at 8 (“The Cowboys would be without their ace lefthander for 
the postseason . . . .”). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Oliver v. NCAA (Oliver I), No. 2008-CV-0762, slip op. at 2–3 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl., Feb. 
12, 2009). 
 7. See NCAA MEMBERSHIP SERVS. STAFF, 2008–09 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL § 12.3 
(2008), available at http://ncaapublications.com/Uploads/PDF/D1_Manual9d74a0b2-d10d-45 
87-8902-b0c781e128ae.pdf (prohibiting collegiate players from contracting with agents and 
limiting contact between player representatives and professional organizations). 
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Oliver’s punishment was swift and severe; he lost eligibility for post-
season play in 2008 and for the entire 2009 season,9 compromising his 
value in the 2009 MLB draft.10 
Typically, a trial court opinion in Erie County, Ohio has little 
national significance. But the trial judge invalidated the NCAA’s no-
agent rule—a result predicted by almost no one but Andrew Oliver’s 
attorney.11 Although the case has since settled,12 this action represents 
a first blow to the NCAA’s rules against professional agents 
representing college athletes.13 The damage done to the no-agent rule 
is probably irreversible:14 because the NCAA was unable to 
 
 8. Oliver I, slip op. at 15. 
 9. Id., slip op. at 4. A similar 2002 enforcement action against Vanderbilt player Jeremy 
Sowers led to a six-game suspension, and the no-agent rule has otherwise been only sparsely 
enforced. Fitt, supra note 1, at 8. Oliver returned to play following a court order and was the 
ninth pick in the second round, and the fifty-eighth overall pick, when selected by the Detroit 
Tigers in the 2009 Major League Baseball draft. Press Release, Okla. State Univ., Oliver 
Selected on First Day of Major League Baseball Draft (June 9, 2009), available at 
http://www.okstate.com/sports/m-basebl/spec-rel/060909aaa.html. 
 10. See Oliver I, slip op. at 26 (“If an injunction is not granted the Plaintiff would suffer loss 
of his college baseball experience, impairment or loss of future baseball professional career, loss 
in being available for the upcoming draft because he is less likely to be seen, and ongoing 
damage to Plaintiff’s reputation and baseball career.”). Oliver signed with the Detroit Tigers for 
a reported $1.495 million bonus as a second-round draft pick and the fifty-eighth pick overall. 
Steve Kornacki, Tigers Sign Top Picks Jacob Turner, Andrew Oliver, MLIVE.COM, Aug. 18, 
2009, http://www.mlive.com/tigers/index.ssf/2009/08/tigers_sign_top_draft_picks_ja.html. 
 11. See Fitt, supra note 1, at 9 (suggesting that a challenge to the no-agent rule would fail 
and that, at most, modest changes may be achieved through indirect pressure). 
 12. Aaron Fitt, Oliver Settlement Restores ‘No Agent’ Rule, BASEBALL AM., Oct. 8, 2009, 
http://www.baseballamerica.com/blog/college/?p=2568 (reporting the NCAA’s $750,000 
settlement with Andrew Oliver). However, the case was unlikely to be overturned on appeal in 
Ohio if the parties had not reached a settlement agreement. See Oliver I, slip op. at 8 (“An 
application for an injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of this Court, and unless there 
is a plain abuse of discretion on the part of this Court in granting or for that matter in refusing 
injunctions, reviewing courts will not disturb such judgments.” (citing Perkins v. Vill. of Quaker 
City, 133 N.E.2d 595 (Ohio 1956))). The NCAA has, as expected, filed a challenge to the ruling, 
but this initial appeal was denied as premature, and only the damages portion of the trial 
remained. Oliver v. NCAA (Oliver II), No. 2008-CV-0762, slip op. at 5–8 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl., 
Apr. 1, 2009). 
 13. Oliver I, slip op. at 18–21. 
 14. See Michael Cross, Andrew Oliver, the MLB Draft, and the College World Series, 
ULTIMATE SPORTS INSIDER, May 25, 2009, http://www.ultimatesportsinsider.com/2009/05/ 
andrew-oliver-mlb-draft-and-college.html (“I don’t see how the NCAA can put the genie back 
in the bottle regarding legal representation for [student] athletes.”); Fitt, supra note 12 (“[I]f the 
NCAA plans to actually try to enforce the rule . . . the return to the status quo won’t last 
long.”). Before the 2009 draft, the NCAA issued a memo to college baseball players that was 
interpreted as a scare tactic to minimize the impact of the Ohio court’s ruling. Liz Mullen, 
Agents, Union Question NCAA Memo on Baseball Advisers, SPORTSBUSINESS J., May 18, 2009, 
http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/62483. The NCAA later had to explain the memo 
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successfully defend its enforcement of the rule in court, the Oliver 
case and its hefty subsequent settlement will encourage student-
athletes to challenge enforcement actions that damage their prospects 
for the professional drafts. 
Those wondering whether the NCAA goliath can be brought 
down by a pebble thrown in Erie County will be disappointed; the 
reality of the impact is likely far murkier. The likely loss of the no-
agent rule considerably undermines the NCAA’s traditional defense, 
namely, the inherent value of amateurism. But the NCAA’s 
anachronistic definition of amateurism was likely far more restrictive 
than necessary to achieve the organization’s primary legal goals: 
insulation from labor law, antitrust violations, and tax liability.15 The 
NCAA likely has the flexibility to bear the loss of this rule and a 
number of other amateurism battles and still maintain its exempt 
status.16 
This Note examines the NCAA’s amateurism rules in the context 
of one of their underlying purposes—the insulation of the NCAA and 
colleges from areas of law that would otherwise apply17—and 
concludes that the NCAA could and should adopt more permissive 
amateurism rules. The new rules would better reflect the reality of 
intercollegiate athletics and still comply with legal standards for 
amateurism, particularly those of the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS).18 Part I contextualizes the amateurism discussion, including the 
 
in contempt hearings, Michael Cross, Andrew Oliver Case Update: NCAA Avoids Contempt of 
Court, ULTIMATE SPORTS INSIDER, July 14, 2009, http://www.ultimatesportsinsider.com/ 
2009/07/andrew-oliver-case-update-ncaa-avoids.html, but the organization continued to 
intimidate college baseball players into not hiring agents. See Letter from Stephen T. Webb, 
Assoc. Dir. of Amateurism Certification, NCAA Eligibility Ctr., to Baseball Prospective 
Student-Athletes (Aug. 19, 2009) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“It is our staff’s 
understanding that you were selected by a Major League Baseball (MLB) club in the June 2009 
Rule 4 Draft and have decided not to sign a professional contract. Please provide the following 
information relating to your contact with MLB clubs and your relationship with your 
advisor. . . . Please note that NCAA regulations require you to provide complete and accurate 
information to the NCAA Eligibility Center relating to your amateurism certification 
request.”). 
 15. See infra Part IV.A. 
 16. See infra Parts III.B–IV.A. 
 17. Amy Christian McCormick & Robert A. McCormick, The Emperor’s New Clothes: 
Lifting the NCAA’s Veil of Amateurism, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 495, 497 (2008) (identifying 
areas of law “in which the myth of amateurism has served to shield university athletic programs 
and the NCAA from regulation”). 
 18. Although the NCAA could conceivably also qualify as a tax-exempt trade organization 
under IRS rules, it is important that the NCAA qualify under the amateur sports and education 
exemptions because of its role as an umbrella organization for collegiate athletics organizations. 
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evolution of the ideal of amateurism in sport. Part II describes the 
rules that the NCAA has implemented to protect amateurism and 
their widespread failure and resulting collateral damage. Part III 
examines the general legal import of amateurism and significantly 
adds to the tax law analysis, suggesting that the NCAA can 
deregulate amateurism without triggering tax consequences. Finally, 
Part IV evaluates how a redefinition of amateurism would impact the 
NCAA’s legal protections and provides a model for a new 
amateurism. This Note’s model would advance trends that would not 
only preserve the legal status of the NCAA as an amateur sports 
organization but would also deregulate intercollegiate athletics to the 
benefit of the athletes. 
I. THE IDEAL OF AMATEURISM 
The NCAA defines amateurism in both normative and positive 
terms: “Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, 
and their participation should be motivated primarily by education 
and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived. Student 
participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student-
athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and 
commercial enterprises.”19 
The NCAA’s normative definition of amateurism addresses the 
motivations of players, recalling an earlier history of amateurism. But 
the current descriptive reality of collegiate amateurism exposes the 
irony of the NCAA. Characterizing student participation in college-
level athletics as an “avocation” is actually a truer statement than the 
NCAA’s drafters likely intended: the word means both “[a]n activity 
taken up in addition to one’s regular work or profession, usually for 
enjoyment” and “[o]ne’s regular work or profession.”20 Internally 
contradictory, the word perfectly captures the NCAA’s amateurism 
dilemma.21 
Amateurism is assumed to be good. This notion of amateurism is 
characterized by nostalgia for a time when sport was played for pure 
love. This misremembered glory serves as the foundation for the 
 
If the NCAA failed to plausibly preserve the distinction, the author contends that colleges 
would likely form a new umbrella organization that better protects the tax exemption. Thus, a 
retreat to other exemptions would be largely self-defeating. 
 19. NCAA MEMBERSHIP SERVS. STAFF, supra note 7, § 2.9 (emphasis added). 
 20. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 124 (4th ed. 2000). 
 21. See infra Part II. 
FITT IN FINAL 2.DOC 11/6/2009  2:26:01 PM 
560 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:555 
modern sense of loss elicited by today’s mottled state of amateur 
sport. The amateurism mythology originated in early Greece where, 
as the fiction insists, the original Olympians were unsullied by 
compensation for sport.22 This history is largely allegoric; there were 
actually no known bars to compensation in ancient Greece.23 Greeks 
often generously rewarded athletes, with prize purses reaching ten 
years’ wages.24 The early disciples of Olympic amateurism in the 
United States, however, fed the false archetype: “The [Olympic] 
Games . . . lost their purity and high idealism. . . . [S]port must be for 
sport’s sake.”25 
Between the emergence of the Greek ideal of sport and its errant 
recollection in modern times, amateurism surfaced in England in a 
form remembered with less fondness. Amateurism, as defined in 1866 
by an English organization, demanded that amateur athletes had 
never taught athletics for pay or competed for prizes.26 The amateur 
ideal evolved in modern England so that gentlemen would never have 
to lose at sport to commoners.27 American sport thus reinvented 
Greek heroes to justify an ideal actually bred by Victorian classism. 
The imprint of this tradition is still visible in modern American 
athletic governance. 
In 1906, the Intercollegiate Athletic Association, an organization 
that would eventually evolve into the NCAA,28 held its first 
convention to develop restrictive principles of amateurism.29 There 
 
 22. See Definition of an Amateur Athlete: Nations of the Earth Where Modern Sport 
Flourishes to Agree on More Drastic Rules to Keep Professionalism Away from Amateurism, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1913, at S4 [hereinafter Definition of an Amateur Athlete]; see also Amateur 
Athlete Status Is Defined: Must Compete “Only for Love of Sport”—Certain Kinds of Prizes 
Barred, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1914, at 8 (describing changes to the Olympic model to preserve 
amateurism). 
 23. Kenneth L. Shropshire, Legislation for the Glory of Sport: Amateurism and 
Compensation, 1 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 7, 9–12 (1991). 
 24. Id. at 10. 
 25. Id. at 11 (quoting AVERY BRUNDAGE, USOC REPORT OF THE GAMES OF THE XIV 
OLYMPIAD 23–25 (1948) (second alteration in original)). 
 26. Id. at 12–13. 
 27. The definition was class-divisive and protectionist: “The Amateur Athletic Club of 
England was established to give English gentlemen the opportunity to compete against each 
other without having to involve and compete against professionals.” Id. at 12. 
 28. NCAA, The History of the NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?ContentID=1354 
(last visited Oct. 24, 2009). 
 29. Kay Hawes, Debate on Amateurism Has Evolved over Time: Association Prepares for 
Another Round of Talks on the Issue at 2000 Convention, NCAA NEWS, Jan. 3, 2000, 
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?ContentID=26742. 
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was to be no recruiting (termed “proselytizing”) of top preparatory 
school athletes, and no scholarships were permitted for athletic 
ability.30 The gentility provisions from early English sport remained.31 
This maxim of once a professional, always a professional, though now 
less restrictive, is still pervasive in NCAA regulation of amateurism.32 
The early amateurism battle within the Intercollegiate Athletic 
Association revolved around baseball.33 As it grew in popularity 
during the early twentieth century, baseball spawned opportunities 
for athletes to profit in major, minor, and summer leagues.34 The 
summer leagues, which attracted large numbers of intercollegiate 
baseball players, drew prompt criticism.35 According to some critics, 
those who participated in the summer leagues lost eligibility merely 
by associating with professionals, whether or not there was 
remuneration for play.36 To others, the motivation to participate in 
the summer leagues was more benign, and the intercollegiate players 
were analogous to other students who used their talents for pay, such 
as actors37 or perhaps musicians. 
The dialogue between two university officials captured the 
contrasting viewpoints of the NCAA amateurism debate.38 Amos 
Alonzo Stagg of the University of Chicago opposed any relaxation of 
the amateurism rules.39 With Nostradamic insight, Stagg stated his 
fire-and-brimstone vision of the future of amateurism: “[I]t is my 
prophecy that in a few years you will find that many of our large cities 
will be supporting professional football teams composed of ex-college 
players . . . the passing of [less restrictive amateurism rules] would be 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See infra Part II.A. 
 33. See Trying to Define Amateur Athlete: Intercollegiate Athletic Association Committee 
Suggests Strict Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1909, at 53 (describing a proposed definition of 
amateurism that would end the practice of college students playing baseball in summer leagues 
for pay). 
 34. See Hawes, supra note 29 (“One of the first divisive issues in the NCAA involved 
amateurism. In the 1900s, professional baseball began to grow in popularity. Many college 
athletes began turning to minor-league baseball as a way to make money during the summer 
months, setting off a heated debate.”). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See id. (describing the amateurism debate between Amos Alonzo Stagg and J.P. 
Welsh). 
 39. Id. 
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an unceasing catastrophe.”40 Professor J.P. Welsh of Pennsylvania 
State University casts the debate in terms of intrinsic capitalism, 
arguing that a college student who earns money during the summer 
“needs to be let alone in the full, free, untrammeled exercise of his 
American citizenship, which entitles him to life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness, which sometimes means money.”41 
There were passionate and vocal advocates on both sides of the 
amateurism debate. When the committee on summer baseball 
reported back to the national organization, however, its report was 
clear: amateurism directly opposes the playing of athletics for 
material gain.42 The NCAA provisions explicitly prohibited paid 
summer baseball participation.43 The amateurism debate emerged 
again after World War I, with returning soldiers attending college and 
playing football for pay on the weekends.44 Again, the student-
athletes lost the amateurism battle.45 Now when athletes play on 
summer teams in Cape Cod or in the Carolinas, they do so without 
pay,46 and weekend play during the school year is not permitted. As 
the preceding history suggests, “the vexed question” of amateurism 
demonstrates the “difficulty of drawing the line between ‘love’ and 
‘money.’”47 
 
 40. Id. While Stagg’s vision has largely come true, few would likely describe its results as 
“unceasing catastrophe.” 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id.; Trying to Define Amateur Athlete: Intercollegiate Athletic Association Committee 
Suggests Strict Law, supra note 33. 
 43. Hawes, supra note 29; see also id. (“In 1916, the Association’s members finally agreed 
to insert a definition of amateurism into the bylaws. The definition that passed was one written 
by the Athletic Research Society: ‘An amateur athlete is one who participates in competitive 
physical sports only for the pleasure and the physical, mental, moral and social benefits directly 
derived therefrom.’”). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. Although the NCAA rules prohibited summer baseball for pay, enforcement 
continued to be a problem. See id. (“Summer baseball continues to give much trouble in the 
enforcement of the amateur law. . . . It is to be regretted that all the colleges do not unite on a 
whole-hearted and effective effort to prevent their undergraduates playing, without loss of 
amateur status, baseball for money or its equivalent.” (quoting Palmer E. Pierce, President, 
NCAA)). 
 46. Summer leagues, however, often arrange for other summer employment for the players 
that provide a source of income and accommodates their playing schedule. See infra notes 168–
71 and accompanying text. 
 47. Definition of an Amateur Athlete, supra note 22. 
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II. THE REALITY OF AMATEURISM IN INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORT 
The NCAA’s amateurism idealism has failed to foster its 
intended reality. The amateurism principle rests on two prongs: the 
athletes are unpaid and they are not merely professionals in training. 
Along these lines, the NCAA has attempted to insulate college sports 
from becoming a supermarket for professional teams.48 The first 
prong of the amateurism principle is supported by compensation 
rules.49 The second prong is theoretically supported by the twin pillars 
of the no-agent and no-draft rules.50 But the no-agent rule, a seldom-
enforced51 but formidable hammer, is crumbling in practice. The 
protective measures of the NCAA, which faces a now perennial 
discussion about commercialization,52 are under attack. 
Section A of this Part describes the NCAA’s rules to protect 
amateurism. Section B recounts the commercialization of 
intercollegiate athletics and depicts the NCAA’s idealistic notion of 
amateurism as practically unrealistic. For example, some of the 
 
 48. See generally NCAA MEMBERSHIP SERVS. STAFF, supra note 7, §§ 12.1–.6 (listing the 
rules related to amateurism). 
 49. See id. § 12.02.3 (“A professional athlete is one who receives any kind of payment, 
directly or indirectly, for athletics participation except as permitted by the governing legislation 
of the Association.”); id. § 12.1.2 (“An individual loses amateur status . . . if the individual: 
(a) [u]ses his or her athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport; 
(b) [a]ccepts a promise of pay even if such pay is to be received following completion of 
intercollegiate athletics participation; (c) [s]igns a contract or commitment of any kind to play 
professional athletics, regardless of its legal enforceability or any consideration received . . . .”); 
id. (listing prohibited forms of pay and exceptions); id. § 12.2 (describing permissible and 
impermissible interactions with professional teams); id. §§ 12.4–.5 (limiting the employment of 
student-athletes and the promotional appearance or use of student-athletes’ reputations). 
 50. See id. § 12.2.4 (explaining the draft rules and exceptions); id. § 12.3 (barring certain 
interactions with agents). 
 51. See generally Fitt, supra note 1 (describing widespread disregard for the rule and its 
rare enforcement). The discussion regarding enforcement of the no-agent rule centers largely on 
the sport of college baseball. The incentive to break the rule is not as high in other college 
sports, and thus the rule may have more overall effectiveness in those sports. 
 52. See, e.g., ANDREW ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS: COMMERCIALISM AND 
CONFLICT IN BIG-TIME COLLEGE SPORTS 195 (1999) (“If, as college sports continues to 
commercialize, the NCAA loses some of its cartel powers and tax benefits, then many predict 
the 1997 restructuring will be followed by a formal exodus of big-time schools.”); McCormick & 
McCormick, supra note 17, at 496 (“[T]hese college sports are fantastically commercial and 
decidedly not amateur.”); Gabriel A. Morgan, Note, No More Playing Favorites: Reconsidering 
the Conclusive Congressional Presumption that Intercollegiate Athletics Are Substantially Related 
to Educational Purposes, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 149, 181–86 (2007) (explaining the effects of 
commercialism); Gary Brown, Brand Calls for Increased Focus on Commercialism, NCAA 
NEWS, Jan. 16, 2009, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?ContentID=43969 (summarizing former 
NCAA President Myles Brand’s request for a recentered focus on positive commercialism). 
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NCAA’s amateurism rules are largely flouted with impunity. This 
discussion lays the foundation for a modified definition of 
amateurism, described in Part IV, that better reflects the reality of 
college sports. 
A.  Rules Protecting Amateurism 
The theme of amateurism runs deeply throughout the NCAA’s 
rules and bylaws. The organization’s constitution lists twin 
amateurism goals: to develop and ensure compliance with satisfactory 
standards of amateurism53 and “[t]o cooperate with other amateur 
athletics organizations in promoting and conducting national and 
international athletics events.”54 The “basic purpose” of the 
organization’s “fundamental policy” is to retain a clear line of 
demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional 
sports.55 The NCAA relates this foundational goal to an educational 
purpose and states that the clear line of demarcation comes from the 
integration of the athlete into the student body and the placement of 
athletics within the entire education system.56 The principle of 
amateurism57 is thus a bedrock of the modern NCAA. 
The NCAA’s direct regulation of amateurism falls into the two 
previously denoted categories: the prevention of remuneration and 
the creation of a barrier between amateur and professional athletics. 
Other rules that indirectly maintain amateurism take the form of 
paternalistic rules that govern the activity engaged in by athletes, 
coaches, and agents. 
1. No Pay.  The no pay rules prevent the amateur athlete from 
using his or her athleticism “directly or indirectly” for pay in any form 
in that sport,58 accepting a promise of future pay (even if after 
college),59 and receiving any form of financial assistance from anyone60 
 
 53. NCAA MEMBERSHIP SERVS. STAFF, supra note 7, § 1.2. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. §§ 1.2–.3. 
 56. See id. (“A basic purpose of this Association is to maintain intercollegiate athletics as 
an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student 
body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and 
professional sports.”). 
 57. See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text. 
 58. NCAA MEMBERSHIP SERVS. STAFF, supra note 7, § 12.1.2(a), (d). 
 59. Id. § 12.1.2(b). 
 60. Id. § 12.1.2, 12.3.1.1, 12.4–.5. 
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with few exceptions.61 The rules strictly limit the financial aid or 
benefits that the student may receive including academic aid, gifts 
after the completion of eligibility, outside aid entirely for educational 
purposes, research grants, and even basic travel or reimbursement of 
expenses.62 The athlete cannot use his or her name, reputation, or 
athletic popularity for pecuniary gain.63 Some of the restrictions may 
simply be to close procedural loopholes likely to be abused, but a 
number of the more draconian rules evoke the ideal of the selfless 
unpaid Olympian, who was not even permitted to receive 
reimbursement for time out of work to compete.64 
2. Clear Line of Demarcation.  The NCAA holds the line 
between professional and intercollegiate athletics largely by refusing 
to permit student-athletes to express a profit motive.65 Many of the 
ways that student-athletes would manifest their self-interest directly 
collide with the NCAA’s motivational script for student-athletes. For 
example, the NCAA significantly limits the ability of student-athletes 
to hold themselves out as potential professional athletes through 
limitations on draft entry (the no-draft rule).66 The organization 
prohibits the signing of a contract or any commitment of any kind to 
play professional athletics,67 competition on any professional athletics 
team in that sport (even without pay),68 and any agreement with an 
agent for representation and promotion.69 
 
 61. See id. at 190 tbl.15-1 (identifying some types of financial aid that a student-athlete may 
receive). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. §§ 12.4–.5 (limiting athlete employment and the promotional appearance or use of 
student-athlete reputation). 
 64. See E.A. Glader, Restrictions Against “Broken-Time” to Open Olympics, in OLYMPISM 
47, 47 (Jeffrey Segrave & Donald Chu eds., 1981) (describing payment for time away from a job 
when “involved in practice for competition, competition itself, or traveling to or from 
competition or practice” as “generally interpreted to be prohibited by the eligibility rules for the 
Olympic Games.”). 
 65. See NCAA MEMBERSHIP SERVS. STAFF, supra note 7, §§ 12.1.2, 12.2.4–.5, 12.3–.6 
(describing rules regarding employment, future employment, agents, draft entry, and bars 
limiting the use of student-athlete reputation or image for commercial purposes). 
 66. See id. § 12.2.4 (setting forth rules on draft entry). 
 67. Id. § 12.1.2(c). 
 68. Id. §§ 12.1.2(e), 12.2.3.2. 
 69. Id. §§ 12.1.2(g), 12.3. 
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3. Protection from Professionalism.  The NCAA engages in a 
parental monitoring of students’ outside pay,70 their agreements and 
interactions with agents,71 and their interactions with coaches or 
professional sports organizations.72 The goals are manifold, but at 
least part of the motive in these rules is to preserve the purity of 
college sport.73 Student play on other amateur teams is limited 
individually by sport to vacation and out of season play.74 The 
participation on any professional team renders a student ineligible for 
the sport, even if the student received no pay.75 Colleges are 
prohibited from using financial inducements, except approved 
financial aid,76 in recruiting,77 and coach contact with students is 
checked by a complex web of regulations.78 Professional negotiations 
are limited by a combination of strategies including barring attorney 
or agent contact with the professional team, prohibiting the presence 
of the agent during negotiations, and strictly limiting the provision of 
benefits from agents to student-athletes.79 Thus agreements between 
student-athletes and agents are often left unstated and pushed 
underground.80 Such rules attempt to enforce a sharp division 
between professionalism and amateurism, and they purportedly 
protect students from the business of sports. The results, however, are 
of little benefit to athletes.81 
 
 70. See id. § 12.1.2 (explaining in detail payments resulting in loss of amateur status). 
 71. See id. § 12.3 (regulating interactions with sports agents). 
 72. See id. § 12.2 (regulating involvement with professional teams). 
 73. Id. § 1.3.2 (“A basic purpose of this Association is to . . . retain a clear line of 
demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.”). The NCAA has also 
vigorously argued in court that its rules are necessary to safeguard amateurism. See, e.g., 
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984) (“It is reasonable to assume that most of the 
regulatory controls of the NCAA are justifiable means of fostering competition among amateur 
athletic teams . . . .”); Wendy T. Kirby & T. Clark Weymouth, Antitrust and Amateur Sports: 
The Role of Noneconomic Values, 61 IND. L.J. 31, 40 (1985) (“The NCAA defended [sanctions 
against a football team] as necessary to preserve amateurism in intercollegiate athletics. 
(discussing Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983))). 
 74. See NCAA MEMBERSHIP SERVS. STAFF, supra note 7, § 17 (explaining regulations 
regarding the playing seasons and when, by sport, student-athletes may participate on other 
amateur teams). 
 75. Id. §§ 12.1.2(e), 12.2.3.2. 
 76. Id. § 13.2.1. 
 77. Id. § 13.1. 
 78. See id. art. 13 (listing rules for recruiting). 
 79. Id. § 12.3. 
 80. See infra Part II.B. 
 81. See infra Part II.B. 
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B.  Shamateurism82 
“[A]s few thoughtful observers doubt, [intercollegiate football 
and men’s basketball at major NCAA institutions] are fantastically 
commercial and decidedly not amateur.”83 Although those singing the 
dirge for lost amateurism are premature in their mourning, the 
realistic observer will note extraordinary amounts of money changing 
hands, fierce competition among collegiate athletes for professional 
opportunities, and the wholesale flouting of many rules that are 
intended to promote and preserve amateurism. 
College sports is a $60 billion industry.84 Arguing that 
intercollegiate athletics “form a thoroughly commercial enterprise,”85 
observers have documented the economic benefit from March 
Madness, Bowl Games, promotions, and the commercial use of 
athletes’ images to the NCAA, conferences, colleges, coaches, and 
corporations.86 
The fruits of athletic labor are disbursed through a web of 
beneficiaries, and the dollar figures are staggering. The NCAA 
reported revenues of $558.2 million for the 2005–2006 academic year, 
approximately $471 million of which inured from the sale of 
broadcast rights.87 The Atlantic Coast Conference alone generated 
$148.9 million in the same period and distributed over $120 million to 
its member schools.88 In turn with astronomical revenues, athletic 
department budgets have ballooned: at Division I universities, the 
growth in athletic budgets has outpaced the growth in overall 
spending at a rate of over two-to-one.89 Finally, individuals employed 
by college athletic departments have also benefited from the immense 
popularity of intercollegiate athletics: “[t]he average salary, excluding 
 
 82. The term is often used to identify the hypocrisy of the ideal of amateurism when 
viewed in the broader context of the commercial realities of sport. See, e.g., Michael S. Straubel, 
Doping Due Process: A Critique of the Doping Control Process in International Sport, 106 DICK. 
L. REV. 523, 570 n.301 (2002) (defining shamateurism as “the gap in the former rules that 
allowed ‘amature’ [sic] athletes to get paid under the table”). 
 83. McCormick & McCormick, supra note 17, at 496. 
 84. Id. at 496–97. 
 85. Id. at 505. 
 86. Id. at 509–44. 
 87. Id. at 510. 
 88. Id. at 511–12. 
 89. See id. at 520 (“For example, from 1995 through 2001, athletic budgets at Division I 
schools increased by twenty-five percent while overall spending at those institutions rose by 
only ten percent.”). 
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benefits, incentives, and other perquisites, for [coaches] in the elite 
basketball conferences—the ACC, Big 12, Big East, Big Ten, Pacific 
10, and SEC—is $1.2 million per year.”90 For example, Roy Williams, 
the basketball coach at the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill, earns an average of $2.6 million annually,91 excluding his 
lucrative promotional deals with such major corporations as Coca-
Cola.92 
Given the multi-million dollar salaries of their coaches, it is not 
unexpected that the players themselves dream of large signing 
bonuses and lucrative athletic shoe deals. Six hours before the deal 
deadline, the number one overall pick in the 2007 Major League 
Baseball draft, Vanderbilt left-handed pitcher David Price, signed a 
six-year contract with the Tampa Bay Devil Rays for $8.5 million.93 In 
2009, San Diego State University right-handed pitcher94 Stephen 
Strasburg signed with the Nationals for a record $15.1 million in total 
guaranteed pay.95 For the most talented collegiate athletes, college 
play can resemble major league tryouts with ever-escalating potential 
salaries and bonuses. 
With so much money on the line, it is no surprise that many 
NCAA rules are worked around or widely flouted. The NCAA is 
constantly forced to alter its rules to close loopholes that open; at 
times, it seems as though the NCAA is “governing out of a covered 
wagon.”96 For example, a recruiting phone call ban led to a barrage of 
e-mail and text messages requesting that recruits call the coaches of 
their own initiative.97 But not all coaches go to such lengths to violate 
 
 90. Id. at 530. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Keith Jarrett, Coke Ad Features Carolina’s Williams: Commercial Centers on 
Coach’s Childhood Playing Ball in Asheville, ASHEVILLE CITIZEN-TIMES, Feb. 28, 2007, at A1 
(describing a Coca-Cola commercial featuring Roy Williams). 
 93. Tyler Hissey, Devil Rays Agree to Terms with David Price, RAYSDIGEST.COM, Aug. 15, 
2007, http://rays.scout.com/2/668823.html. 
 94. Player Bio: Stephen Strasburg, San Diego State Official Athletic Site, 
http://goaztecs.cstv.com/sports/m-basebl/mtt/strasburg_stephen00.html (last visited Oct. 24, 
2009). 
 95. Jim Callis, The Strasburg and Ackley Deals, BASEBALL AM., Aug. 17, 2009, 
http://www.baseballamerica.com/blog/draft/?p=1724. 
 96. Mark Kreidler, There Are Always Ways Around a Phone Ban, ESPN.COM, May 26, 
2006, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/columns/story?columnist=kreidler_mark&id=2459290. 
 97. See id. (satirizing the resulting flouting of the ban). Ignoring the rules is how the game 
is played. In holding up a mirror to truth, one satirist wrote: 
  I think Coach realizes that you have all my numbers, so don’t be afraid to use 
them! As an official representative of Midwest U., I am free and clear to take your 
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the intent of the rules without actually breaking them. Former 
Indiana basketball coach Kelvin Sampson was sanctioned for making 
577 extra calls to prospects after a phone ban was in place.98 
Previous scandals include secret booster clubs that raised money 
for payments to football players and other similar rogue booster 
tales.99 Emerging markets for athletes consistently rely on the flouting 
of NCAA rules, and those who refuse to participate in the mutual 
back scratching or winking-and-nodding are lambasted as poor 
recruiters:  
Tony Squire . . . said the state of North Carolina has become 
“infested with street agents,” adding that “there is no question it has 
changed. What is happening now, the kids are changing and people 
are running around now offering kids stuff. Nowadays, if somebody 
comes in with some money, ‘You come play with us and you don't 
have to worry about anything coming from your 
pocket.’” . . . What’s more, the NCAA rules . . . are routinely 
flouted.100 
The no-agent rule101 falls under all three rulemaking categories 
associated with amateurism (preventing pay or benefits to athletes, 
enforcing the clear line of demarcation between amateurism and 
professional sports, and protecting the student-athlete from 
exploitation) and is an example of a restrictive rule that has failed to 
achieve the NCAA’s desired policy goals. The rule’s decline serves as 
an example of overly restrictive and ineffective rules that define 
 
calls any time you want to make them. Why, Coach might even be standing nearby 
when your incoming call lights up my RAZR! And if he’s nearby, he might even be 
able to hear what you’re saying if we should happen to go on speakerphone! Hint, 
hint! 
Id. 
 98. Bud Withers, Kelvin Sampson Takes Heat from All Over, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 21, 
2008, at D4. 
 99. E.g., Fernando Dominguez, There’s Plenty to Share Blame for Northridge Football 
Folly, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 2000, at D15 (providing background information on a series of 
NCAA compliance problems suffered by California State University, Northridge, including an 
unauthorized booster club providing benefits to athletes); Douglas S. Looney, Deep in Hot 
Water in Stillwater, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 3, 1978, at 18, available at 
http://vault.sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1093819/index.htm 
(describing a secret Oklahoma State University athletics booster club). 
 100. Eric Prisbell & Steve Yanda, A Whole New Ballgame that Williams Won’t Play, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 13, 2009, at E01. 
 101. The rule has provisions banning any agreements with agents, the presence of an outside 
advisor during contract negotiations, and any benefits from agents. See supra Part II.A.2–3. 
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amateurism in a way that is too tightly linked to the ideal of 
amateurism rather than a description of amateurism based in reality. 
The flouting of the no-agent rule is perhaps most common in the 
sport of baseball. In June of each year, the Major League Baseball 
(MLB) draft occurs for high school prospects, rising and graduating 
college seniors, underclassmen who meet age eligibility requirements, 
and junior college players.102 Baseball compensation contracts can 
have a few moving parts: a signing bonus, a contingency payment, 
incentive bonus payments, and a college scholarship plan.103 
Negotiations with athletes may continue until the mid-August 
deadline.104 If a deal is not reached by that point, the player has 
chosen not to pursue the contract but to return to or enroll in college. 
Yet the intricate contract negotiations usually begin long before the 
draft. 
A player’s draft potential is comprised of a number of factors. 
Physical talent and long-term major league potential are the primary 
factors.105 A player’s “makeup,” or a composite of character traits that 
could affect his career, is another factor.106 The list is not complete, 
however, without the additional factor of “signability.”107 Signability 
matters primarily because draft picks are valuable tools for building 
the best farm system. To maximize its draft picks, a team must know 
in advance the likelihood that it will reach an acceptable deal with the 
draft prospect. Players that seem likely to return to or enroll in 
college, to choose to play for a professional team in another sport, or 
to request a sum of money that is higher than their value to the team, 
 
 102. Richard T. Karcher, The NCAA’s Regulations Related to the Use of Agents in the Sport 
of Baseball: Are the Rules Detrimental to the Best Interest of the Amateur Athlete?, 7 VAND. J. 
ENT. L. & PRAC. 215, 219 (2005). 
 103. Id. at 220. 
 104. See John Manuel, Signing Deadline Didn’t End Draft Intrigue, BASEBALL AM., Aug. 
27, 2008, http://www.baseballamerica.com/today/draft/news/2008/266761.html (providing an 
example of end-game draft deadline negotiations). 
 105. Interview with Aaron Fitt, National Writer, Baseball Am., in Durham, N.C. (Mar. 3, 
2009). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Signability is the likelihood that a player will sign a contract for an amount that a team 
is willing to pay. E.g., Jim Callis, Mauer, Prior Rekindle One Versus Two Debate, BASEBALL 
AM., Sept. 12, 2003, http://www.baseballamerica.com/today/minors/030912mauerpoy_callis.html; 
Kevin Gorman, “Signability” a Factor for Pirates, PITTSBURGH TRIB., June 7, 2007; Ken 
Gurnick, Signability Is Key for Dodgers’ Draft Plan, MLB.COM, June 6, 2006, 
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20060606&content_id=1492360; Farid Rushdi, MLB: 
When Teams Draft Signability, Not Talent, BLEACHER REP., Jan. 2, 2009, http://bleacher 
report.com/articles/100329-mlb-when-teams-draft-signability-not-talent. 
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are often selected lower in the draft than raw talent would project.108 
At the same time, players need to maximize their bargaining power 
and contract at a rate close to their market value. Without an agent to 
communicate with the team, the student-athlete is at a disadvantage 
in the draft selection and contract negotiation processes. College 
players and their families are, for the most part, unsophisticated 
parties conducting a one-time transaction across the table from a 
sophisticated and well-staffed professional sports organization 
seeking to minimize the signing bonuses and salaries of its prospects. 
Thus, players who strictly follow the no-agent rule may face the 
consequences of the unequal bargaining power. To some observers, 
maintaining this bar against agent or attorney representation 
produces unconscionable results.109 
“The NCAA is a bully, and they’ve been beating up on these 
kids and these schools for years, and everybody’s been taking it. I 
can’t believe people put up with it, I really can’t[,]” said Rick 
Johnson, who mounted a successful multi-prong attack on the 
NCAA’s no-agent rule in the Andy Oliver case, winning an injunction 
as well as a $750,000 settlement after an initial ruling on the merits.110 
The systematic flouting of some rules suggests two things. First, 
the rules fail to reflect the realities of a changing perception of 
amateurism. Second, the rules may be too numerous, complicated, or 
difficult to enforce. The corrosion of the no-agent rule was speeded 
by its unenforceability, widespread disobedience (at least in the case 
of baseball, for which the timing of the draft before the conclusion of 
the season made it essential for players to contract with agents before 
 
 108. Matt Blood, Ability, Not Signability, BASEBALL AM., June 6, 2008, 
http://www.baseballamerica.com/today/draft/news/2008/266305.html. 
 109. See Fitt, supra note 1, at 8 (“You’re talking about a huge business issue that nobody 
should expect some amateur player coming out of high school or college to be able to deal with 
on their own.”). 
 110. Fitt, supra note 12; Aaron Fitt, Oliver Wins Suit Against NCAA, BASEBALL AM., Feb. 
12, 2009, http://www.baseballamerica.com/blog/college/?p=746. Additionally, one major league 
scouting director noted: 
  [The NCAA] expects us to call and say, ‘Hey, we had a deal with this kid’s 
adviser, but he went back into school?’ Come on, we’re not going to do that. Why do 
we care? . . . You enforce it, or do something once you get ahold of it. It’s not that 
hard to pick up a paper—you can read about it. The college coaches know these guys 
are represented. You’d think the NCAA would get more involved if they care, 
because we’re playing a charade here if we think these players are representing 
themselves, and it’s just family advisers after they get drafted. That’s kind of a joke. 
Fitt, supra note 1, at 8; see also id. (“It’s hard to tell just how much of an issue this is for the 
NCAA, which seems to alternate between tough talk and blissful ignorance.”). 
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their collegiate eligibility expired), harsh consequences for student-
athletes even when followed, and intrusion into the attorney-client 
relationship. From the player’s perspective, the risk analysis 
associated with breaking the no-agent rule involves weighing the 
possible but unlikely prospect of enforcement against the known 
negative consequences of following the rule, and the “best” choice 
may frequently be to break the amateurism rules. 
III. AMATEURISM AND THE LAW 
It is unclear where amateurism ends and professionalism begins. 
The legal consequences of reaching that tipping point, however, could 
be grave for the NCAA and universities that participate in 
intercollegiate sport. Section A describes the broad legal framework, 
developed by other authors, that the NCAA and universities must 
consider. Section B lays the foundation for an analysis under tax law. 
Tax exemptions are valuable to both colleges and the NCAA, 
protecting billions in sports revenue from taxation.111 Both Sections 
demonstrate, however, that the NCAA is likely at little risk of losing 
its legal protections and suggest that a liberalized amateurism is 
justified. 
A.  The Potential Risks of a Liberalized Amateurism: Traditional 
Considerations 
In its most apocalyptic incantation, the loss of the no-agent rule 
and the muddied line of demarcation between amateur and 
professional athletics have the potential to undermine legal 
protections specific to amateurism. There are three primary areas of 
the law in which amateurism matters: antitrust, labor, and tax.112 
The perceived susceptibility of the NCAA to antitrust challenges 
has produced significant litigation and legal scholarship.113 The 
 
 111. See supra text accompanying note 85. 
 112. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 17, at 497 (identifying three areas of law 
that shield colleges and the NCAA from regulation). Tax considerations are discussed and 
further developed in Part III.B, infra. 
 113. E.g., Deborah E. Klein & William Buckley Briggs, Proposition 48 and the Business of 
Intercollegiate Athletics: Potential Antitrust Ramifications Under the Sherman Act, 67 DENV. U. 
L. REV. 301 (1990); Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its Second Century: Defender of 
Amateurism or Antitrust Recidivist?, 86 OR. L. REV. 329 (2007); Daniel A. Rascher & Andrew 
D. Schwarz, Neither Reasonable nor Necessary: “Amateurism” in Big-Time College Sports, 14 
SPG ANTITRUST 51 (2000); Laura Freedman, Note, Pay or Play? The Jeremy Bloom Decision 
and NCAA Amateurism Rules, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 673 (2003); 
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resulting rulings, however, tend toward a strong deference to the 
NCAA for both commercial and noncommercial restrictions as well 
as nearly universal acceptance of the NCAA’s amateurism defense.114 
In NCAA v. Board of Regents,115 the Court recognized that the 
product of intercollegiate athletics inherently requires some restraint: 
“[T]his case involves an industry in which horizontal restraints on 
competition are essential if the product is to be available at all.”116 The 
NCAA generally offers an amateurism defense, arguing that the 
procompetitive value of amateurism, furthered by the restraints, 
outweighs any anticompetitive effect.117 The no-draft and no-agent 
rules are generally upheld as “[p]rotection[s] of amateurism” that are 
resistant to antitrust challenges.118 Because the rules apply “short-
circuited” scrutiny,119 the courts thus exhibit a broad deference to the 
NCAA on matters of amateurism.120 The strong educational mission 
of the NCAA specifically and intercollegiate athletics generally help 
the organization to survive challenges.121 Thus, even a highly 
deregulated version of amateurism would likely still constitute a valid 
defense for rules challenged under antitrust law. 
The NCAA is largely immune from workers’ compensation 
claims, claims from athletes under employment law, and unionization 
 
Benjamin A. Menzel, Comment, Heading Down the Wrong Road?: Why Deregulating 
Amateurism May Cause Future Legal Problems for the NCAA, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 857 
(2002); Kristin R. Muenzen, Comment, Weakening Its Own Defense? The NCAA’s Version of 
Amateurism, 13 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 257 (2003). 
 114. McCormick & McCormick, supra note 17, at 500–01. See generally Tibor Nagy, The 
“Blind Look” Rule of Reason: Federal Courts’ Peculiar Treatment of NCAA Amateurism Rules, 
15 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 331 (2005) (laying out the federal court trend of preferential treatment 
of the NCAA in major decisions). 
 115. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 116. Id. at 100–01. 
 117. Muenzen, supra note 113, at 264. 
 118. Id. at 269. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Rascher & Schwarz, supra note 113, at 53 (“[I]n later cases . . . the courts have used 
NCAA v. Board of Regents as a starting point, reading Supreme Court dicta as evidence that 
amateurism itself has passed the reasonableness test, moving forward to evaluate specific 
follow-on rules designed to support amateurism. These cases analyze whether the NCAA’s rules 
are reasonable and necessary for preserving amateurism, not if amateurism itself is reasonable 
and necessary.” (footnote omitted)); Muenzen, supra note 113, at 268–75. 
 121. See Rascher & Schwarz, supra note 113, at 53 (noting that the Supreme Court indicated 
“academic affiliation is what differentiates NCAA football from NFL football, and thus creates 
a market”). 
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efforts by college athletes.122 The reasoning supporting these broad 
immunities is largely grounded in the NCAA’s emphasis on education 
and amateurism. After a few early cases protecting student-athletes as 
employees,123 the ground shifted and the notion was cleanly rejected. 
The authoritative line of workers’ compensation cases have routinely 
failed to extend statutes to student-athletes due at least in part to 
their amateur status.124 Likewise, the NLRB is reluctant to extend 
statutory protection to students who are also employees in other 
contexts.125 
On the labor front, Professors McCormick and McCormick have 
argued that the NCAA’s self-coined and much advertised term 
“student-athlete” allows the NCAA to perpetuate the amateurism 
myth and “obtain the astonishing pecuniary gain and related benefits 
of the athletes’ talents, time, and energy—that is, their labor—while 
severely curtailing the costs associated with such labor.”126 These 
professors cast the NCAA in the role of the “company store” that 
forces many of its workers to live below the poverty line.127 
Focusing on the distinct tests to determine the commercial 
nature of an employee relationship under common law, professors 
McCormick and McCormick find that certain college athletes are de 
facto “employees.”128 The common law test examines the degree of 
control the alleged employer maintained over the working life of the 
alleged employee, and occasionally the “economic realities” of the 
relationship are considered.129 McCormick and McCormick argue that 
the daily lives of student-athletes demonstrate the control that the 
university has over them.130 The student-athlete’s grant-in-aid 
functions as compensation, and student-athletes are economic 
 
 122. Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the Student-Athlete: 
The College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 80–81 (2006). 
 123. See Van Horn v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169, 172 (Ct. App. 1963) 
(finding the student-athlete to be an employee of his university); Univ. of Denver v. Nemeth, 
257 P.2d 423, 430 (Colo. 1953) (holding that a student-athlete’s participation on a college 
football team is within the scope of employment as an employee of the university). 
 124. McCormick & McCormick, supra note 17, at 498 n.16. 
 125. See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 483 (2004) (holding that teaching and research 
assistants are not employees of their respective universities when they are primarily students). 
 126. McCormick & McCormick, supra note 122, at 74. 
 127. Id. at 78–79. 
 128. Id. at 79. 
 129. Id. at 90–92. 
 130. For an account documenting the degree of control that coaches exercise over the lives 
of student-athletes in big-time sports, see id., supra note 122, at 98–118. 
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dependents.131 Assuming that this argument stands a reasonable 
chance of success,132 the NCAA may fear the impending applicability 
of labor law. 
Although student-athletes seem to fit within the common law 
definition of employee, the NLRB’s Brown University133 decision 
indicates that the educational context changes the overall analysis. 
The test articulated by the NLRB in the Brown University case 
requires something other than the traditional “right of control” 
threshold of student-employees.134 Looking at the overall character of 
the employer-employee relationship, the board uses a four-factor test 
to categorize the relationship as either primarily educational or 
primarily economic.135 Under the first factor, the alleged employee’s 
status as a student weighs against recognizing the relationship as one 
of an employer-employee.136 The second factor examines the role of 
the activity within education.137 The third factor evaluates the 
relationship with faculty.138 The fourth and final factor of the test 
considers whether the student has received financial support from the 
institution, which may weigh in favor of a primarily educational, 
rather than commercial, relationship.139 
If the context of the employer-employee relationship is primarily 
educational, labor protections are unlikely to apply.140 Professors 
McCormick and McCormick suggest that some college athletes 
qualify as employees even under the more restrictive Brown four-
 
 131. Id. at 117. 
 132. The applicability of this test is further discussed in Part IV.A, infra. 
 133. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004). 
 134. See id. at 492 (“Moreover, even if graduate student assistants are statutory employees, 
a proposition with which we disagree, it simply does not effectuate the national labor policy to 
accord them collective bargaining rights, because they are primarily students.”); id. at 490 n.27 
(explaining that graduate student assistants are not subject to control by a university in return 
for payment, but rather that their employment is focused primarily on furthering their own 
learning experience). 
 135. Id. at 489, 492; see also McCormick & McCormick, supra note 122, at 120 (describing 
the four-factor test to determine a student’s employee status). 
 136. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 489, 492. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 489. 
 139. Id. at 489, 492. 
 140. See id. at 489–90, 492 (describing and applying the four-factor test used to determine 
that labor protections did not apply because “the overall relationship between the graduate 
student assistants and Brown [University] is primarily an educational one, rather than an 
economic one”). 
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factor statutory test.141 Yet even if the relationship between athletes 
and their institutions is conclusively shown to be of a commercial 
nature,142 the threshold that the relationship is primarily commercial 
rather than educational is much more difficult to meet. Given this 
problem of characterization, the McCormicks’ argument seems 
unlikely to find success in the current legal climate. Thus, it is unlikely 
that the balance against the potential unionization of college athletes 
and the potential application of labor laws to the NCAA and colleges 
will be altered.143 
B.  Working the Officials: Analysis of Amateurism and the IRS 
Given the existing scholarship on antitrust and labor law, this 
Note largely focuses on the potential tax law consequences for the 
NCAA of an evolving definition of amateurism. The boundaries of 
tax law exemptions, perhaps the most important legal exemption for 
the NCAA, are described in this Section. Generally, there are two 
major taxes from which the NCAA and its member schools are 
exempt. First, the NCAA and its member schools are exempt from 
income taxes, which are widely applicable to commercial enterprises, 
including professional sports organizations.144 The second tax 
exemption applicable to the NCAA and its member schools is the 
Unrelated Business Income Tax (UBIT), which taxes otherwise 
exempt organizations on income from a regularly operated trade or 
business.145 
The NCAA is exempt from income taxes as an Internal Revenue 
Code § 501(c)(3) organization.146 An amateur sports organization can 
 
 141. McCormick & McCormick, supra note 122, at 120–55. 
 142. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 17, at 505–44 (arguing that intercollegiate 
athletics are essentially commercial). 
 143. Cf. Rohith A. Parasuraman, Note, Unionizing NCAA Division I Athletics: A Viable 
Solution?, 57 DUKE L.J. 727, 750–52 (2008) (recommending that the National Labor Review 
Board not allow unionization of college athletes in favor of congressional policy determination). 
 144. Josh Centor, House Committee Member Questions Tax-Exempt Status for College 
Sports, NCAA NEWS, Oct. 23, 2006, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?key=/ncaa/ncaa/ 
ncaa+news/ncaa+news+online/2006/associationwide/house+committee+member+questions+tax
exempt+status+for+college+sports+-+10-23-06+ncaa+news (“As a practical matter, educational 
organizations like the NCAA and its member schools are entitled to income tax exemption as 
charitable organizations, just like hospitals or churches.”). 
 145. I.R.C. §§ 501(b), 511–14 (2006). 
 146. Letter from Myles Brand, President, NCAA, to William Thomas, Chairman, H. Comm. 
on Ways and Means 1 (Nov. 13, 2006), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?ContentID=44636 (follow 
“The NCAA’s Response to Chairman Thomas’ Letter” hyperlink). 
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qualify as an exempt organization on four possible grounds: that the 
organization serves an educational purpose; that the organization is 
charitable in nature; that “[t]he organization is organized and 
operated to foster national or international amateur sports 
competition, but does not provide athletic facilities or equipment;” or 
that the organization is a “qualified amateur sports organization” 
under I.R.C. § 501(j).147 The NCAA likely qualifies as both an 
educational organization148 and as an amateur athletics organization,149 
but its argument for tax-exempt status is factually strongest under the 
amateur athletics organization provision.150 The 501(j) exemption 
allows the amateur athletics organization to be a 501(c)(3) exempt 
organization and applies to “any organization organized and operated 
exclusively to foster national or international amateur sports 
competition if such organization is also organized and operated 
primarily to conduct national or international competition in sports or 
to support and develop amateur athletes for national or international 
competition in sports.”151 The classification excludes local recreational 
leagues and such professional leagues as the NFL, NHL, MLB, and 
NBA.152 
For charitable organizations, an unrelated business is subject to a 
separate tax when it is (1) a trade or business, (2) regularly carried on, 
and (3) not substantially related to further the exempt purposes of the 
organization.153 Under the third factor of the unrelated business test, 
the term “substantially related” has been debated in the context of 
 
 147. I.R.C. § 501(j); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 4.76.12.3 
(2003). 
 148. Although the prudence of the presumption has been disputed, there is a congressional 
presumption that athletics are substantially related to an educational mission. Morgan, supra 
note 52, at 160–62. For a discussion of the NCAA’s education argument, see Letter from Myles 
Brand to William Thomas, supra note 146, at app. A. 
 149. Letter from Myles Brand to William Thomas, supra note 146, app. A at 14–18. 
 150. Such a statement assumes the, perhaps unlikely, possibility that the congressional 
presumption may shift. 
 151. I.R.C. § 501(j). 
 152. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 147, §§ 4.76.12.3.1–.4 (describing the 
examination process for determining whether an organization is an exempt amateur sports 
organization); Id. § 7.25.26.4 (describing legislative intent to keep recreational leagues non-
exempt). Although the NFL is exempt under other provisions, Duff Wilson, NFL Executives 
Hope to Keep Salaries Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2008, such an arrangement would be 
insufficient for the NCAA to achieve its broader purpose of protecting its member schools. See 
supra note 18. 
 153. I.R.C. § 513(a) (2006). 
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the NCAA’s commercialization;154 despite the colloquy, momentum 
has not shifted in favor of taxing NCAA income. The consequences 
of such a shift, however, could have far-reaching impacts for both the 
NCAA and its member universities.155 It is thus important for the 
NCAA to work within the boundaries of tax law exemptions in 
defining amateurism. 
The NCAA clings tightly to the clear line of demarcation, but 
much of the organization’s rules, exhibiting a death grip on the old 
amateurism paradigm, are likely unnecessary for tax purposes. Over 
the years, the IRS has developed a line of commentary that yields a 
very deferential standard of amateurism in sport. The IRS’s 
amateurism opinions are available in cases and revenue rulings as 
well as nonbinding agency letter rulings or internal manuals; the sum 
of these parts provides a generally reliable vision of the IRS’s 
amateurism. The following analysis adds to the current research in 
the area and proceeds along five paths: skill, athlete pay and benefits, 
classification, commercialization and public benefit, and legal 
interpretations of amateurism. 
1. Skill.  The colloquial definition of amateurism often divides 
professionals and amateurs on the basis of skill; an amateur may be a 
dabbler, a person who has not gained the level of proficiency 
expected of a professional or is lacking in experience or mastery of 
fundamentals.156 Perhaps recognizing that in the Olympics and other 
international competitions amateur status is rarely associated with 
skill, the IRS does not connect amateurism to a lower skill level.157 In 
 
 154. See, e.g., Letter from Bill Thomas, Chairman, H. Comm. on Ways and Means, to Myles 
Brand, President, NCAA (Oct. 2, 2006), reprinted in Letter from Myles Brand to William 
Thomas, supra note 146, app. C at 6 (exploring how the commercialization of the NCAA men’s 
basketball championship “further[s] the educational purpose of the NCAA and its member 
institutions”); Letter from Myles Brand to William Thomas, supra note 146, at 21–22 
(responding that the telecasting of NCAA events does not make “the purpose of intercollegiate 
athletics anything other than educational in nature for those who participate”); see also Morgan, 
supra note 52, at 154–62 (explaining the UBIT factors, describing congressional presumptions 
favorable to the NCAA, and discussing IRS opposition to these presumptions). 
 155. For examples of the commercial proceeds from intercollegiate athletics that benefit the 
NCAA, conferences, and member institutions, see discussion supra Part II.B. 
 156. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 20, at 
55. 
 157. See Media Sports League, Inc. v. Comm’r, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1093, 1093 (1986) 
(distinguishing the non-exempt petitioner from an exempt amateur sports league on the grounds 
that the petitioner “provides no formal or ongoing instruction to its members, has no skill 
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fact, the presumption is that amateurs are highly skilled players.158 In 
distinguishing social leagues developed for personal recreational 
benefit from amateur organizations, the level of skill required for 
amateurs is assumed to be much higher.159 Recruitment of the best 
athletes, official skills training, and skill prerequisites for play are 
viewed as a public good and encouraged for the furtherance of 
sport.160 Thus, amateurism need not be viewed as a ladder-step 
precursor to professionalism, and leagues that contain players of 
sufficient skill to play professionally are still amateur leagues. 
2. Athlete Pay and Benefits.  Payment matters. The NCAA’s 
efforts to withhold the private benefits of intercollegiate play from 
student-athletes, however, likely extend beyond the requirements of 
the IRS. The only two remuneration schemes that seem to be firmly 
against principles of amateurism are paying athletes a substantial 
formal salary for their play161 and sharing gate receipts from 
intercollegiate sports with the players.162 Other forms of 
compensation, largely prohibited by NCAA regulations, are likely 
much less problematic from the government’s perspective. Although 
 
requirements for eligibility to play in its leagues and does not require members to participate in 
any of its activities”). 
 158. See id. (distinguishing the amateur sports organization from another organization 
seeking to further “amateur athletics” but having a “substantial purpose” to “further the social 
and recreational interests of its members”). 
 159. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 147, § 7.25.26.4(1) (“Congress did not 
intend to grant exemption to social clubs or to organizations of casual athletes or organizations 
whose primary purposes are the recreation of their members.” (citing 122 CONG. REC. 25,961 
(1976) (statement of Sen. Culver))). 
 160. See id. § 7.25.26.4(3) (“The following factors are indicators that an organization is not 
primarily social and/or recreational but rather promotes serious competition in the manner 
contemplated by the two statutes . . . . (C) The caliber of the athletes makes them serious 
contenders for the Olympic or Pan American Games. (D) The athletes must demonstrate a 
certain level of talent and achievement in order to receive support from the organization. (E) 
The organization provides intensive, daily training, as distinguished from sponsoring only 
weekend events open to and attracting a broad range of competitors. (F) The organization 
devotes itself to improving the performance of a small group of outstanding athletes rather than 
emphasizing improvement in the health of the general public.”). 
 161. See id. § 7.25.26.7 (recognizing, but not addressing, the question of private inurement). 
 162. See id. § 7.25.26.8(1) (“The nonprofit organization distributed approximately 95 
percent of the net gate receipts among the players as players’ splits or shares pursuant to 
individual contracts entered into between the corporation and the players. The operation of a 
semiprofessional baseball club is ordinarily a commercial activity and not exempt from federal 
income taxation under IRC 501(c)(4). Rev. Rul. 55–516, 1955–2 C.B. 260, distinguished by Rev. 
Rul. 69–384, 1969–2 C.B. 122.”). 
FITT IN FINAL 2.DOC 11/6/2009  2:26:01 PM 
580 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:555 
they produce taxable income for the student-athlete,163 scholarships 
for the full cost of attendance do not jeopardize amateur status.164 
Likewise, neither nominal monetary awards for participation in 
intercollegiate games nor the provision of housing expenses evoke 
IRS suspicion regarding the public benefit of the organization.165 
Small stipends also seem unobjectionable.166 And even for 
international athletes, the unreimbursed taxpayer provision of 
athletes’ lodging, transportation, and meals is explicitly tax-
deductible.167 
Most surprisingly, the guarantee of jobs for participation in sport, 
so long as the athletes are paid for their work and not their play on 
the field, does not seem to trouble the IRS or the courts. In 
Hutchinson Baseball Enterprises v. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue,168 a semiprofessional team told prospective players “that 
employment will be found for them during the Broncos season, and 
that the pay will be at least minimum wage.”169 The jobs were typically 
manual labor, including roofing, insulation, and yardwork.170 “A few 
players are employed full time by petitioner. These players are given 
field maintenance jobs—picking up trash, cleaning restrooms and 
bleachers, mowing and watering the field, and repairing the field 
surface.” 171 Here, it is important to note that the low-paying jobs 
 
 163. Scholarships beyond the cost of tuition, fees, and required books and supplies are 
taxable income. Internal Revenue Serv., Taxable Income for Students, 
http://www.irs.gov/individuals/students/article/0,,id=96674,00.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2009). 
 164. See Letter from Myles Brand to William Thomas, supra note 146, app. A at 11 (“An 
organization that grants scholarships to students furthers educational purposes.” (citing Rev. 
Rul. 69-257, 1969-1 C.B. 151; Rev. Rul. 66-103, 1966-1 C.B. 134)). 
 165. See Mobile Arts & Sports Ass’n v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 311, 315–16 (S.D. Ala. 
1957) (holding that an organization is tax exempt even where each member of a winning team is 
paid five hundred dollars and each member of the losing team is paid four hundred dollars); 
Hutchinson Baseball Enters. v. Comm’r, 73 T.C. 144, 155 (1979), aff’d, 696 F.2d 757 (10th Cir. 
1982) (holding that an exempt amateur sports league can provide housing and employment to 
amateur players). 
 166. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 147, § 7.25.26.7 (“The forms of support 
may include stipends, payment of living expenses, housing, and scholarships.”). 
 167. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8121070 (Feb. 26, 1981) (“[T]axpayers in the host families [for 
international amateur athletes] are entitled to deduct as charitable contributions, the 
unreimbursed out of pocket expenses paid for the meals, transportation and lodging of visiting 
competitors . . . .”). 
 168. Hutchinson Baseball Enters. v. Comm’r, 73 T.C. 144 (1979), aff’d, 696 F.2d 757 (10th 
Cir. 1982). 
 169. Id. at 148. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
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corresponded directly with rates for manual labor. Abusing this 
permissive approach by arranging sweetheart deals that set players up 
with highly paid consulting positions would likely be met with great 
skepticism by both the agency and reviewing judges. 
3. Classification.  For purposes of amateurism, it matters little if 
the organization is called amateur, professional, or 
semiprofessional.172 The word “semiprofessional” in either the title of 
the league or the competition is, of course, not conclusive proof that 
the organization is not amateur. In short, it does not matter what the 
organization is called; there is no magic language. It is instead the 
characteristics of the athletic organization that define amateur status 
for tax purposes. 
4. Commercialization and the Public Benefit.  Much has been 
written about the commercialization of intercollegiate athletics and 
the potential ramifications in antitrust or tax law.173 It is true that 
extraordinary sums of money are traded and entire industries thrive 
on the existence of intercollegiate athletics. Yet the government does 
not view such actions as objectionably commercial. 
Similarly, IRS agents have refused to overly concern themselves 
with the commercial enterprise of sport. Instead of fees charged or 
revenue collected, it is the public benefit that is of the greatest 
concern to the IRS.174 Congress finds benefit not only in the 
competition of sport on the field but also in the broader development 
of sport.175 This public policy is closely analogous to the public value 
of access, awareness, and participation in the arts. 
 
 172. Id. at 154 (“Tax law does not rely on labels to determine taxability.”). The NCAA, 
however, defines as professional any organization that “[d]eclares itself to be professional.” 
NCAA MEMBERSHIP SERVS. STAFF, supra note 7, § 12.02.4). 
 173. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 174. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200832034 (May 14, 2008) (“[T]he broadcasting of these athletic 
events promotes the various amateur sports, fosters public interest in the benefits of its 
nationwide amateur athletic program, and encourages public participation. Therefore, its sale of 
broadcasting rights and the resulting broadcasting of its athletic events contributes importantly 
to the accomplishment of its exempt purposes.” (citing Rev. Rul. 80-295, 1980-2 C.B. 194)). 
 175. Rev. Rul. 80-296, 1980-2 C.B. 196 (“[T]he educational purposes served by exhibiting a 
game before an audience that is physically present and exhibiting the game on television or 
radio before a much larger audience are substantially similar. Therefore, the sale of the 
broadcasting rights and the resultant broadcasting of the game contributes importantly to the 
accomplishment of the organization’s exempt purposes.”). These rulings, however, are premised 
on the educational purposes of the organization. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH 
CONG., HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT LAW OF THE FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION 
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When the tax-exempt goal of the organization is to promote 
awareness of and participation in amateur sports, the IRS has ruled 
that the sale of broadcasting rights to those amateur sports events is 
not taxable.176 The revenue need not be nominal.177 The IRS rulings on 
this issue also indicate the probability that all sports-related business 
conducted by the NCAA is unlikely to be subject to the UBIT. 
5. Interpreting Amateurism.  The IRS’s evaluation of exempt 
organizations is guided by the Internal Revenue Manual (IRM). The 
IRM suggests that the IRS views the term “amateur sports 
organizations,” particularly under § 501(j), as analogous to the terms 
of the Amateur Sports Act.178 The Act defines amateurs by 
incorporating the definitions of the national governing body (NGB) 
associated with the particular sport.179 The NGBs are thus given 
substantial deference for defining amateurism under both the 
Amateur Sports Act and the IRS interpretations. 
The NGBs are largely autonomous, nongovernmental 
organizations that work with the United States Olympic Committee 
to administer Olympic teams and represent the United States within 
international sports federations. These organizations are also 
empowered to “establish national goals and encourage the attainment 
of those goals”180 and to “serve as the coordinating body for amateur 
athletic activity in the United States.”181 Of the major American 
Olympic sports (there is no national governing body for American 
football), the designated national governing bodies are USA 
Basketball, USA Baseball, USA Hockey, and USA Soccer.182 
 
FOR CHARITIES AND OTHER TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 146–47 (Comm. Print 2005), 
available at http://www.jct.gov/x-29-05.pdf. 
 176. Rev. Rul. 80-295, 1980-2 C.B. 194. 
 177. See id. (permitting the sale of national broadcast rights by a conference). 
 178. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 147, § 7.25.26.7 (“[An organization that pays 
athletes without compromising their eligibility under the national governing body’s rules] fits 
the definition of an amateur sports organization within the ambit of the Amateur Sports Act of 
1978, which establishes the United States Olympic Committee and regulates the United States’ 
participation in the Olympic Games. The Congressional intent underlying both that Act and 
IRC 501(j) is similar.”). 
 179. 36 U.S.C. § 220501(b)(1) (2006) (“‘[A]mateur athlete’ means an athlete who meets the 
eligibility standards established by the national governing body or paralympic sports 
organization for the sport in which the athlete competes.”). 
 180. 36 U.S.C. § 220523(a)(2) (2006). 
 181. Id. § 220523(a)(3). 
 182. See Team USA.org, Team USA, http://teamusa.org/ngb/sports?sport_type=summer 
(last visited Oct. 23, 2009) (listing the national governing bodies for each summer sport); Team 
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The Act is clear that the interpretation of amateurism is intended 
to be broad; NGBs shall “not have eligibility criteria related to 
amateur status or to participation in the Olympic Games, the 
Paralympic Games or the Pan-American Games that are more 
restrictive than those of the appropriate international sports 
federation.”183 The government is furthermore unlikely to find rules 
placing harsh restrictions on athletes’ autonomy as necessary for 
maintenance of amateurism: “Athletes must be given the opportunity 
to decide what is best for their athletic careers . . . . The decision 
should not be dictated by an arbitrary rule which, in its application, 
restricts, for no real purpose, an Athlete’s opportunity to compete.”184 
Finally, the USOC prohibits NGB rules “requiring an Athlete to 
reveal the terms of a personal sponsor contract.”185 
For example, the USA Basketball’s amateurism rules are much 
less restrictive than those of the NCAA. The NGB’s constitution 
defines an amateur athlete as “an athlete who is eligible under FIBA 
rules to compete in international Amateur Athletic Competitions 
conducted under FIBA auspices.”186 FIBA is the Fédération 
Internationale de Basketball, an international amateur sports 
organization. FIBA prohibits the pay of a player or team during the 
Olympic Games, but it otherwise permits players to enter into written 
contracts for payment with club teams.187 Although excessive 
professional-scale pay for amateur athletes in amateur competitions 
would likely evoke private inurement concerns, it is clear that 
stipends, living expenses, housing, and scholarships are all 
 
USA.org, Team USA, http://teamusa.org/ngb/sports?sport_type=winter (last visited Oct. 23, 
2009) (winter sports). 
 183. 36 U.S.C. § 220522(a)(14) (2006). 
 184. Letter from Jim Scherr, CEO, U.S. Olympic Comm., to Executive Dirs. and Presidents, 
Nat’l Governing Bodies pt. A(5) (Nov. 8, 2005), http://teamusa.org/pages/4062 (quoting 1978 
Senate Report on the Act). 
 185. Id. pt. C(4)(d). 
 186. USA BASKETBALL, CONSTITUTION OF USA BASKETBALL § 1.2 (2008), available at 
http://www.usabasketball.com/inside.php?page=constitution. 
 187. FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE DE BASKETBALL, INTERNAL REGULATIONS 2008: 
REGULATION H RULES GOVERNING PLAYERS, COACHES, SUPPORT OFFICIALS, AND 
PLAYERS’ AGENTS (2008), available at http://www.fiba.com/downloads/training/agents/ 
Eligibility_NationalStatus_International_Transfers_of_Players.pdf (“H.1.6 Players may enter 
into a written contract with a club. This contract may state that the player will receive payment.; 
H.1.7 Players who participate in professional leagues must belong to organisations which are 
members of the member federation; otherwise they will not be able to participate in the official 
competitions of FIBA; H.1.8 No financial remuneration for the performances of a player or a 
team is permitted during the Olympic Games.”). 
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permissible. Agents are permitted, but regulated; they are required to 
have clear contractual terms and abide by ethical rulings.188 
In the baseball context, the demarcation line for amateurism is 
similarly muddied. In simplest terms, an amateur is someone who is 
not being paid for playing “professional” baseball.189 But the 
standards for who can compete and play in USA Baseball games 
varies; “[w]e first introduced professional athletes into our 
organization in 1999 with the Pan-American games, which was a 
qualifier for the 2000 Olympic Games, and most recently have used 
professional athletes in the 2008 Beijing Games.”190 Minor league 
players are considered professionals and would be ineligible for some 
national teams,191 but those national teams are subdivided by specific 
class or age rather than amateur status.192 The NGB’s World Baseball 
Classic team, on the other hand, includes such well-known 
professionals as Derek Jeter and Kevin Youkilis.193 
In sum, to understand the IRS definition of amateurism, one 
should look to the Amateur Sports Act, defining amateurism by 
reference to the NGBs for each sport. Those NGBs may then defer to 
the international organizations for guidance. The definitions used by 
the NGBs and international organizations often provide a greater 
degree of freedom to the amateur athlete and permit athletes to play 
for pay in at least some contexts. The IRS permissiveness suggests 
that the tax code intends amateurism to be defined broadly for bona 
fide amateur organizations. 
 
 188. See FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE DE BASKETBALL, INTERNAL REGULATIONS 2008: 
RULES GOVERNING PLAYERS, COACHES, SUPPORT OFFICIALS, AND PLAYERS’ AGENTS, at 
H.5.6.2.1(p), available at http://www.fiba.com/downloads/training/agents/Eligibility_Players_ 
Agents.pdf (stating that the agent’s duty is “to demonstrate integrity and transparency in all of 
his dealings with the client”); id. Annex 1 to Regulation H5 (providing short standard contract 
between player and agent). 
 189. The organization does not incorporate a definition of amateurism in its constitution or 
bylaws, and the question is one that the organization had not previously confronted. If it were 
confronted with this question, the organization would most likely defer to USOC and the 
International Baseball Federation (IBAF). Telephone Interview with David Perkins, Chief 
Operating Officer, USA Baseball (March 4, 2009) (“[What is an amateur] is a question that 
we’ve never been asked before.”). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See USABaseball.com, http://web.usabaseball.com/index_a.jsp (follow “Teams” 
hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 24, 2009) (listing collegiate team and teams divided by age). 
 193. USABaseball.com, 2009 World Baseball Classic Team Rosters, http://web.usabaseball. 
com/events/events.jsp?ymd=20090507&content_id=36900&vkey=event_usab (last visited Oct. 
24, 2009). 
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IV. PLAYING THE GAME: PROPOSALS FOR REDEFINING 
AMATEURISM IN INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 
A.  The Legal Effect of Adopting a “New Amateurism” 
The law has broadly painted the rough boundaries of 
amateurism; the NCAA, on the other hand, has confined athletes to a 
narrowly defined zone well within the bounds of law. Although the 
NCAA’s version of amateurism need not perfectly overlap with the 
Internal Revenue Service’s amateurism, the NCAA should use the 
crumbling of its amateurism rules as an opportunity for liberalizing 
amateurism and updating the concept. 
A modernized definition of amateurism, described further in 
Part B, would acknowledge the profit motive of college athletes 
without permitting payment, discard onerous rules that serve no 
practical purpose, and re-imagine rules to create true protections. A 
redefined amateurism could be beneficial or neutral in the context of 
NCAA legal protections. Courts and agencies are likely to continue 
to defer to the congressional desire for legal insulation of amateur 
sports and college athletics organizations.194 Although it may seem 
counterintuitive, further deregulation of amateurism may actually 
strengthen the NCAA’s antitrust and employment law position 
without impacting its tax status. 
First, the NCAA may be aided in its antitrust defense by further 
deregulation of amateurism. The regulations maintaining amateurism 
are anticompetitive measures, and the NCAA’s response to this 
anticompetitive charge is that the measures serve the larger prosocial 
purpose of amateurism. It seems improbable that the amateurism 
defense would be significantly weakened by a redefinition of 
amateurism;195 the principle of amateurism would still serve as an 
important distinction between professional sports and college sports, 
and whatever procompetitive or prosocial goals professedly served by 
the maintenance of amateurism would still be served under a 
broadened amateurism regime. Perhaps the most important 
implication of this Note’s amateurism proposal is that it would reduce 
the NCAA’s susceptibility to lawsuits. The limitations preventing 
 
 194. See supra Part III.A. 
 195. See Muenzen, supra note 113, at 286 (arguing that weakening amateurism may be 
problematic for the NCAA’s antitrust defense but suggesting that “the NCAA would be wise to 
limit the amount of economic restraints it places on its members”). 
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student-athletes from making business contracts, promoting 
themselves, or engaging in professional negotiations with adequate 
counsel trigger antitrust concerns. Enforcement actions supporting 
those often arbitrary anticompetitive rules are the typical predicate 
for athlete-initiated antitrust challenges to the NCAA. Thus, a regime 
that reduces the anticompetitive limitations on college athletes could 
reduce the overall amount of litigation. Moreover, these changes 
could bolster the NCAA’s argument that it imposes only reasonable 
restraints on trade and that some restraints are absolutely necessary 
to protect amateurism in intercollegiate athletics. Put simply, 
reducing economic restraints would aid the NCAA in its own defense. 
The second benefit of this Note’s amateurism proposal is that, 
under a labor law analysis, both the common law and the Brown 
factors would be more likely to favor the NCAA under a less 
restrictive regime. The common law analysis, in which the most 
important factor is the degree of control over the working life of the 
alleged employee, would significantly change with a relaxation of the 
amateurism rules. The NCAA would be much less likely to fail this 
test under the rule changes this Note proposes. By permitting athletes 
to work in largely unrestricted employment, play on other teams 
during the summer for pay, and openly pursue future employment 
with professional sports, the NCAA would reduce its control of the 
working lives of its student-athletes and also reduce the athletes’ 
financial dependence upon the NCAA and its member institutions. In 
one enforcement action, a student-athlete whose scholarship support 
ran out was sanctioned for accepting free groceries.196 This example 
illustrates the excessive control that the organization has over the 
financial lives of the athletes and highlights the economic dependency 
that underlies this relationship. Permitting student-athletes to have 
greater freedom to pursue compensation and reasonably enhance 
their economic position would fundamentally change the 
characterization of the current relationship in a manner that favors 
labor law protections for the NCAA. 
Similarly, relaxed amateurism rules would further solidify the 
NCAA’s ability to satisfy the Brown criteria. Athletes would still be 
required to maintain full-time student status, satisfying the test’s first 
prong, and the sport’s role in education would likewise remain static. 
 
 196. Parasuraman, supra note 143, at 728 (citing Steve Springer, Edwards Suspended for 
One Game; UCLA: Linebacker Ordered to Pay Restitution for $150 Worth of Groceries Left at 
His Apartment, Allegedly by Agent, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1995, at C4). 
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But under a regime limiting intense control over the students’ daily 
lives, the relationship with faculty and coaches would shift in a way 
that favors the NCAA in a Brown balancing test. This shift would 
favor the NCAA because it is the relationship, and not the time 
commitment, that weighs in the balance. The financial support given 
by the institution to the athlete would also help to anchor the 
NCAA’s ability to satisfy the final prong of the four-factor Brown 
test. The grants-in-aid and scholarship system is, operationally, the 
exclusive197 opportunity for some athletes to earn income, driving the 
relationship between an institution and its athletes closer to an 
employer-employee relationship. Under the current system, the 
institution seems to provide payment for exclusive control of the 
athlete’s physical labor. This is particularly true when contrasted with 
the general student population who may work independently, 
unfettered by restrictions on their most marketable skills, and may 
trade on their names and reputations. By giving student-athletes the 
economic autonomy that most college students enjoy, the NCAA can 
remove itself from the role of financial dictator and eliminate the 
appearance of an employer-employee relationship. 
Additionally, the IRS provides wide latitude for a redefinition of 
amateurism within bounds of a favorable tax status. Thus, these 
antitrust and labor justifications, in addition to the tax analysis 
provided in Part III, suggest that the NCAA can and should broaden 
the scope of amateurism and create a less restrictive regime. 
B.  Redefining Amateur 
It is important to recognize that the modern NCAA scheme is a 
product of liberalization. There is, however, much room for 
improvement. With respect to NCAA sports that have analogous 
professional organizations, the amateur should simply be defined as 
one who does not currently play for a professional team in that sport, 
does not receive a salary or compensation tied to intercollegiate play 
in excess of basic living expenses and tuition, and is a full-time 
student in good standing. 
Such a fundamental redefinition through simplification would be 
beneficial for a number of reasons. First, the NCAA’s 
acknowledgement of student-athletes’ profit motive would 
 
 197. The time demand of big-time college athletics makes employment during the season 
difficult. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 122, at 98–108 (documenting some of the 
time demands on college football and basketball players). 
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accommodate opportunities for professional growth. Second, rule 
changes would reduce the quantity of unenforceable and overly 
restrictive rules that endanger the legitimacy of all of the NCAA’s 
rules because of their arbitrary enforcement. Third, a less restrictive 
rule-making ethic would permit the NCAA to better fulfill its 
organizational goals by substituting rules that are actually in the best 
interests of the student-athlete for the present system of paternalistic 
authoritarianism. Changes to less restrictive rules would also be 
beneficial to the NCAA in reducing litigation and bolstering the 
NCAA’s defenses in both the labor and antitrust law contexts. 
1. For Love of the Game: Acknowledging the Profit Motive.  The 
benevolent athlete is no longer the hallmark of sport. When fourteen-
time Olympic gold medalist Michael Phelps was photographed with a 
marijuana bong, his most serious consequence was not the three-
month ban on competitive swimming imposed on him by USA 
Swimming but the potential impact of the incident on his 
sponsorships.198 Prominent American athletes are often wealthy 
celebrities. Shaquille O’Neal, for example, had the capital to offer his 
own mortgage bailout plan to Orlando residents.199 Tiger Woods and 
Michael Jordan are among the masters of athletic cross-promotion. 
Being paid for their skill has not negatively impacted the public’s 
view of these athletes’ fidelity to the ideal of sport, and some very 
highly paid athletes are even considered to embody that ideal.200 
The profit motive, spurred by the cultural status and wealth of 
such star celebrity athletes, is a powerful incentive for many college 
athletes. Athletics is viewed as a way of paying for college, and many 
athletes incorporate athletics into their future financial planning. 
More than one in five Division I male athletes hope to play 
 
 198. See Phelps Suspended from Competition, Dropped by Kellogg, CNN.COM, Feb. 6, 2009, 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/02/05/kellogg.phelps. 
 199. Mark Schlueb, Thousands Want Help from Shaq, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 17, 2008, 
at B1. 
 200. There is an argument that when an athlete has arrived at the pinnacle of the sport, they 
continue to play for pure love of sport alone because fortune and fame no longer serve as 
substantial motivating factors. Ironically, perhaps an athlete such as Michael Jordan, who 
reached the highest ranks of professional sports and continued to play, embodies the pure 
devotion to sport that the NCAA idealizes. Cf. Michael A. McCann, It’s Not About the Money: 
The Role of Preferences, Cognitive Biases, and Heuristics Among Professional Athletes, 71 
BROOKLYN L. REV. 1459, 1489–90 (2006) (examining evidence that professional athletes play 
for many reasons other than money including loyalty, camaraderie, family, and winning). 
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professionally.201 Although not every college athlete who dreams of 
the NBA, NFL, NHL, or MLB is grounded in reality, thousands of 
student-athletes can and do have the chance to enter the professional 
ranks every year. This opportunity represents extraordinary economic 
potential for top prospects, and thus it is a rational decision to pursue 
professional opportunities to the fullest. 
The NCAA’s canonical emphasis on “going pro in something 
other than sports”202 may represent the likely outcome of an 
intercollegiate athletics career, but the college sports dream is no 
longer simply a short love story. The dream is to rise to the realm of 
athletic nobility, where the heroes are richly rewarded for their 
triumph over the limitations of the human body. The NCAA’s 
myopia regarding the professional aspirations of college athletes in 
major sports creates a culture of amateurism that inaccurately reflects 
contemporary intercollegiate athletics. 
The NCAA’s approved athletic motivations, which focus on 
physical improvement and the love of sport, are based not in legal 
prescience but in obsolete romanticism. The law allows a much more 
flexible and fluid conception of amateurism than the NCAA 
approves; therefore, the NCAA has a wide breadth within which to 
redefine amateurism. The law comprehends that athletes are 
motivated by profound devotion to the ideal of sport, an appreciation 
of the physical and social benefits of athletic participation, and the 
potential for profit. A “new amateurism”203 composite that maintains 
alignment with the law’s distinction between amateurism and 
professionalism can track the continuing cultural evolution of sports. 
2. Reduction of Restrictive Rules.  The NCAA’s labyrinthine rules 
surely result in unintentional violations. More surprising, however, is 
 
 201. Stacy A. Teicher, College Athletes Tackle Their Financial Future: Former Student 
Athletes Go on the Road to Show Their College Counterparts How to Avoid Making the Same 
Mistakes They Did, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 3, 2005, at 13, available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1003/p13s02-legn.html. Only about 1 percent of college athletes 
succeed. Id. 
 202. E.g., Gary Brown, Wheaton’s King to Have Artwork Displayed at NCAA Convention, 
NCAA NEWS, Jan. 8, 2009, http://www.ncaa.com/sports/w-lacros/spec-rel/010809aaa.html 
(“We’re all familiar with the tagline on the NCAA’s promotional ads that say ‘[t]here are more 
than 400,000 student-athletes and most of them will go pro in something other than sports . . . .’” 
(quoting the NCAA’s Director of brand strategies and events Damon Schoening)). 
 203. The call for a new amateurism has been sounded, but the vision for that amateurism 
varies. E.g., W. Burlette Carter, The Age of Innocence: The First 25 Years of the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association, 1906 to 1931, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 211, 273–84 (2006). 
FITT IN FINAL 2.DOC 11/6/2009  2:26:01 PM 
590 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:555 
the mass nullification by disobedience of some NCAA rules to which 
schools, coaches, and professional teams turn blind eyes. Because the 
NCAA relies on its members for enforcement of its amateurism 
standards, the NCAA should reexamine its rules and limit them to 
those truly necessary to protect amateurism. A morass of antagonistic 
rules is not required by law; a redefined amateurism can shed rules 
related to athlete employment, summer sport participation, agents, 
promotion, and entry into the draft. Focusing on the most important, 
enforceable rules and prohibiting pay for participation on the 
intercollegiate sports teams would achieve the goals of preserving 
amateurism and halting an athletics department arms race. 
Importantly, from a legal perspective, such targeted rules will prevent 
the judiciary from overturning rules or enforcement actions as 
arbitrary and capricious. 
3. Substitute Protections for Paternalism.  The NCAA justifies a 
number of its rules as putative protections of athletes from 
commercial abuse. But in reality, those rules may be widely 
unenforceable and detrimental to the interests of the athletes. 
Paternalistic rules restrict athlete autonomy, limit choice, and may not 
be in the athletes’ best economic interests. Rules that have these 
negative effects on student-athletes but fail to provide significant 
protections should be abolished, including any formulation of the no-
agent rule, NCAA restrictions on draft entry, and rules limiting 
student-athletes’ employment or use of their own names, images, or 
reputations for compensation. 
The no-agent rule prohibits athletes from adequately pursuing 
promotion and negotiations in their best economic interests. The rule 
also may interfere with the attorney-client relationship between 
agent-attorneys and prospects. It may also result in sophisticated 
parties exerting unfair bargaining power over unsophisticated parties. 
The NCAA’s no-agent cure here is worse than the NCAA’s feared 
agent plague. 
Alternative systems suggest that amateurism can be retained 
while permitting athletes to contract with agents. Professor Richard 
Karcher has proposed supervision of the athlete-agent relationship.204 
 
 204. Karcher, supra note 102, at 224–25 (proposing standardized representation 
agreements); see also Timothy Davis, Regulating the Athlete-Agent Industry: Intended and 
Unintended Consequences, 42 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 781 passim (2006) (calling for a more 
effective means of regulating the athlete-agent industry). 
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Similarly, the international basketball organization requires agents to 
conform to its standards and provide clear contract terms.205 A 
requirement that agents have law degrees would help ensure that 
agents are qualified to review and negotiate complex contracts and 
would actually protect naïve players. 
A deregulated version of draft entry for collegiate athletes would 
provide more opportunities for student-athletes to maximize their 
profitability and economic potential. Varying rules against multiple 
draft entry essentially establish a timeline for strategic professional 
decisions. Blanket NCAA prohibitions thus poorly account for 
variations between the draft processes and require athletes to commit 
to play on a college team for specific periods of time. The interests at 
risk in deregulation of drafts are largely those of the student-athletes’ 
investors—the colleges. But the restrictions on draft entry limit the 
probability that an athlete will enter the draft at the height of his 
amateur career, which may cause the athlete to lose draft value and 
bargaining power. 
If amateurism is defined largely by an absence of the hallmarks 
of professionalism, then the line between sports leagues may become 
more permeable. National and international amateur sports 
organizations recognize that semiprofessional and amateur sports 
take many forms and exclusive membership on any particular team is 
not required for an athlete to be an amateur. Likewise, the NCAA 
should permit collegiate athletes to participate on multiple teams. 
Permitting at least some compensation from those outside activities is 
also reasonable. 
Regulating student-athletes’ alternative employment gives the 
organization strong control over the daily lives of student-athletes 
and limits the student-athlete’s range of economic choices. But this 
paternalism ultimately fails to improve the lives of student-athletes. 
For some athletes, the most marketable skill they possess is their 
athletic ability; restricting student-athletes’ ability to capitalize on this 
asset reduces their value in an employment market and thus their 
economic potential. Allowing student-athletes to choose to take on 
any kind of part-time work, to negotiate more advantageous athletic 
contracts, and to receive limited compensation from other amateur 
 
 205. See FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE DE BASKETBALL, supra note 188, H.5.3.3. 
(requiring agents to be licensed); id. H.5.6.2.1(a) (requiring agents to abide by FIBA 
regulations); id. H.5.6.2.1.(p) (requiring agents to demonstrate transparency in their dealings 
with clients). 
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teams would provide them with valuable experience and economic 
independence. The amateurism resulting from this liberalized regime 
would more closely resemble the athletics world as it is, rather than 
the world as the NCAA would like it to be. 
CONCLUSION 
The dense rules that the NCAA has imposed to protect the 
intercollegiate athletics enterprise from labor, tax, and antitrust 
consequences are both unnecessary and misguided. The system that 
has developed gives only the NCAA and colleges a seat at the 
bargaining table, excluding the voice of the student-athlete. This 
exclusion is inappropriate given the dramatic impact of the rules on 
the daily lives and career arcs of the student-athletes. 
Perhaps this design flaw is a result of commercialization, 
collective action problems, and unequal bargaining power. But the 
NCAA’s failure to act in the best interests of student-athletes is more 
complex, and it may be inextricably linked to society’s failure to 
recognize the hypocrisy of college athletics compared to other skilled 
endeavors. Student-athletes are expected to yield nearly total control 
to an educational institution and a third-party organization for their 
professional and personal decisions, self-employment autonomy, and 
rights to their images, name, and reputations. But other hyphenated 
students who serve dual educational roles—such as the student-
musician, the student-actor, the student-artist, and the student-
dancer—are not expected to make the same sacrifices. The 
susceptibility of the student to the harms of commercialization is no 
greater in the case of the student-athlete than in the case of the 
creative composer or poet. And the slight differences between 
student-athletes and other uniquely talented students do not justify 
the NCAA’s micromanagement of student-athletes. Some regulations 
may be necessary, but the extent of the NCAA’s incursion into the 
private life of the student-athlete is not. 
The legal background of the amateurism debate suggests that the 
law has evolved with a changing cultural definition of amateurism, 
but the NCAA lags behind in recognizing athletes as they are. 
Despite its complicity in the increased commercialization of sport,206 
the NCAA has failed to create adequate accommodations for the 
professional and financial well-being of student-athletes. Indeed, 
 
 206. E.g., Brown, supra note 52. 
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some of the very rules drafted to protect student-athletes 
disadvantage them at the bargaining table. It is thus time for an 
amateurism that better serves the modern goals and realities of 
amateur sport and does not dictate student-athletes’ every decision. 
The amateur athlete need not be wholly self-sacrificing in order to 
play for love of the game and create value for the public. 
